Many see the agreement as a turning point in Western and Arab relations. He denied the promises made by the United Kingdom to the Arabs concerning an Arab national homeland in the territory of Greater Syria, in exchange for British support for the Ottoman Empire. The agreement was published with others on November 23, 1917 by the Bolsheviks in Moscow and repeated on November 26, 1917 in the British Guardian, so that “the British were embarrassed, the Arabs dismayed and the Turks happy.”    The legacy of the agreement has sparked much discontent in the region, especially among Arabs, but also among Kurds, who have been denied an independent state.     The agreement was initially used directly as the basis for the Anglo-French Vivendi mode of 1918, which provided a framework for the management of the enemy territories occupied in the Levant. More broadly, it should indirectly lead to the subsequent division of the Ottoman Empire after the Ottoman defeat of 1918. The deal largely overlooked the future growth of Arab nationalism, which the British government and military used to their advantage against the Turks. After the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, the Allies – Britain, France and Russia – had many discussions about the future of the Ottoman Empire, which is now fighting on the side of Germany and the middle powers and its immense territory in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and southern Europe. . . .